We consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders. The k highest bidders get an object and pay the k + 1st bid. Bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this auction. We then consider a sequence of auctions Ar with nr bidders and kr objects. We show that price converges in probability to the true value of the object if and only if both kr ` co and nr -kr ` cO, i.e., both the number of objects and the number of bidders who do not receive an object go to infinity.
tion are very strong. In equilibrium, winning the object conveys the information that n -1 other bidders received less favorable news about the value of the object. As n -1 grows, this winner's curse becomes arbitrarily powerful and so for high bids to be optimal the bidder's own signal must be correspondingly powerful. In Wilson's setting this is satisfied because for any v', there must be a signal that is impossible for v < v'. Working in a setting with a finite set of values, Milgrom (1979) shows that this is essentially necessary: a necessary and sufficient condition for full information aggregation is that for every v < v', and any M, there is a signal s' that gives a likelihood ratio on v' versus v of at least M. That is, there must be signals that come arbitrarily close to ruling out values below v'.2 Both the intuition and the result generalize to uniform price auctions with any fixed number of objects (Milgrom (1981) ).
These assumptions are very strong: for every value v' there is a signal s' such that no matter what other information the bidder infers from the behavior of his opponents, he still puts arbitrarily small probability on v being less than v'. We thus view the Wilson and Milgrom results as essentially negative: only under extreme informational assumptions is information fully aggregated. This brings us to our point of departure from the existing literature: for many auctions where information aggregation is of interest, and certainly when using these auctions as models of other markets, it seems appropriate not only to let the number of buyers grow large, but to let the number of available objects grow large as well.
We consider the allocation of a set of k identical objects by an auction mechanism. The objects have unknown value v. Each of n bidders receives a signal about v before submitting his bid. Signals satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property. In contrast to the Wilson and Milgrom settings, we assume that a single signal can only change the likelihood of any subset of values by a multiplicative factor uniformly bounded away from 0 and oo. Thus the posterior of a bidder after having received any signal has every possible value v in its support and density bounded away from zero and infinity. We work with a continuum signal space. However, intervals of signals are allowed to be identical. An example satisfying our assumptions is the information structure where all signals s < s are equivalent and similarly all signals s > s are equivalent so that there are effectively only two distinct signals. This serves to emphasize the contrast between the informational structure of our setting and that in the Wilson and Milgrom models.
Bidders choose bids as a function of their signal about value. The k highest bidders each get an object and pay a price equal to the k + 1st highest bid, receiving a payoff equal to the difference between value and price. 2To see why these conditions are sufficient in Wilson's setting, let s' be the largest signal that rules out values below v'. The strength of the winner's curse essentially rules out values above v' when a bidder with signal s' wins in equilibrium. Therefore, the player knows that if he wins with signal s', the value of the object is essentially v'. Since many other bidders will have received signals nearly as favorable as s', competition for the object rules out prices much below v'. The convergence result follows. rium examined is surprisingly good at information aggregation. However, one might ask if there are other equilibria that do not satisfy full information aggregation. If this were true then full information aggregation would not be a fundamental property of this market, but rather a consequence of a special choice of equilibrium.
We think the restriction to symmetric equilibria is quite natural in our setting, since the symmetry assumption can be viewed as an anonymity assumption. Anonymity seems a natural requirement when modeling large markets.3 So, establishing that no other symmetric equilibrium exists goes some distance in strengthening our conviction that information aggregation is a feature of the market under consideration, and not just of a particular equilibrium.4
Section 2 characterizes the equilibrium of the model for fixed k and n and discusses the uniqueness result. Section 3 explores the behavior of the equilibrium price distribution as the auction grows large. It states and proves the main theorem and examines the cases in which kr/lr goes to zero and in which the fraction of informed bidders becomes small. Section 4 concludes.
Related Literature
Palfrey (1985) asks whether aggregate output in a Cournot oligopoly with decentralized information about marginal cost and demand converges to the output of the corresponding full information setting as the number of firms goes to infinity. He shows that a sufficient and essentially necessary condition for this result is that the likelihood matrix relating signals to states is "invertible." This requires, in particular, that there are at least as many signals as states. In contrast, our results hold even if there are only two distinct signals although our state space is infinite. In Palfrey's model, average output must be equal to the full information output in each state. Thus, state by state, the overproduction of some firms must be exactly compensated by the underproduction of other firms. In contrast, in our model all that matters is that in each state v, the right number of bidders bids above the correct v. The magnitude by which bidders underbid or overbid is irrelevant. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1994) analyze two candidate elections with common values and give conditions under which full information aggregation is obtained in equilibrium. Full information aggregation in an election means that the candidate elected is the same as would be elected if all the private 3Anonymity also plays a central role in the literature on convergence of dencentralized trading models to competitive equilibria: see Gale (1986), and Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) who show how a violation of anonymity can lead to a noncompetitive limit.
4A result stating that the symmetric equilibrium is the only equilibrium (symmetric or otherwise) would be even nicer. This is false, because of the equilibrium in which players 1. k bid more than the highest possible value regardless of their signal, while the others, knowing they have no chance of winning at a price less than the highest possible value, bid 0. If one rules out weakly dominated strategies, then we suspect that the symmetric equilibrium is indeed unique, but we are unable to show this. information were common knowledge. Similar to the k + 1st price auction analyzed here, in a voting model the action of a player (the vote) only matters when he is pivotal and so a voter (like a bidder in an auction) has to condition on being pivotal. Thus the mechanism that guarantees full information aggregation in the present model is also at work in elections.
A natural question is the degree to which our results depend on the assumption of identical preferences. In Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1996) we explore information aggregation results in a model in which objects have a common component of value-a quality-about which players have some information, but in which players also have idiosyncratic differences in tastes. In that model there is a tension between information aggregation and allocative efficiency for a fixed number of objects and bidders: for information aggregation, bids must reflect information about quality. But, for allocative efficiency, it must be that players with higher idiosyncratic tastes bid more than those with lower tastes regardless of their information about quality.5 Nevertheless we show that when the number of objects and bidders goes to infinity, objects are allocated to those who value them most and price reveals true quality. Thus, our information aggregation result is robust to the introduction of preference diversity.
We concentrate here on the pure common value case for several reasons. First, the driving force behind information aggregation is clearest in this simple case. Second, this setting differs from that of Wilson and Milgrom only in having weaker signals and nonnegligible supply. Thus our results establish that it is the assumption of fixed supply that makes their strong information assumptions necessary. Third, in the pure common value case we are able to characterize equilibria explicitly and prove uniqueness. This allows us to show both necessity and sufficiency of double largeness for information aggregation. With differing tastes we give a (stronger) sufficient condition for full information aggregation but cannot show necessity. Finally, the forces driving information aggregation in the setting with idiosyncratic tastes are somewhat different than those at work here. In particular, the pure common values result cannot be thought of as a special case of the result with idiosyncratic tastes.
MODEL AND EQUILIBRIUM
We begin by characterizing the equilibrium of the model with a fixed number of bidders and objects. There are n bidders, labelled i = 1,... , n, and k identical objects. Each bidder puts value v on a single object, and 0 on further objects. The value v is common across players, but unknown; v is drawn according to a distribution F(.) with support [0,1]. 5For a paper illustrating a related tension between information aggregation and allocative efficiency, see Shin (1995 For the remainder of the paper, we use -q to denote min {l 772, 3). Assumption 1 implies that the prior over values has no mass points and that the support of the prior is all of [0,1]. Assumption 2(i) requires that the limit of an increasing sequence of signals conveys information that is close to that conveyed by the elements of the sequence (all that follows will go through without 2(i), but at the cost of increased notation). Assumption 2(iii) imposes that signals only convey a bounded amount of information. This distinguishes the current analysis from the work of Wilson and Milgrom. In particular, in Milgrom's analysis Assumption 2(iii) was shown to imply a failure of information aggregation with fixed k. Assumption 2(iv) requires that higher signals are at least weakly better news than lower signals. Assumptions 2(i) and 2(iv) together imply that there is a positive probability of receiving a signal that conveys information and so a large population of bidders has information that determines v with great precision if properly aggregated. Clearly, without this property we could not expect the equilibrium price to converge in probability to V.6 6Assume that the true value is w = v + a-, where, as before, signals are IID conditional on v, and where both signals and v are independent of u. Then, all our results would carry through in the sense that the true v would be revealed by price (which would converge to v + c). So of course, the real point is that asymptotically the auction mechanism reveals all available information about quality.
Because we require only weak MLRP, it is possible that pairs of signals s, s' will be equivalent in the sense that for every pair v, v' If X(s) is not a singleton, than equilibria will typically involve a range of bids given a signal in X(s). Since a player who receives a signal in X(s) is indifferent between any of those bids there are many ways to represent this strategy, involving, for example, mixing for each signal, or submitting lower bids for higher elements of X(s). However, it is easily seen that for any distributional strategy, there is a strategy that is pure and increasing on each X(s), such that this strategy yields the same payoff to the player, and is indistinguishable to any 7In earlier drafts of this paper, we worked with a finite set of signals satisfying strict MLRP. Given the imbedding, it is clear that the results of this paper have as special cases the results for the finite signal case. other player.8 Note that strategies which differ only in their representation over sets X(s) generate the same joint distribution over values, bids, and equilibrium prices. In the following we will always use a representation of the strategy which is pure and increasing over sets '(s).
We consider symmetric Nash equilibria. Thus, when we describe the equilibrium strategy of bidder 1 we also describe the whole equilibrium profile. Let s(j) be the random variable denoting the jth highest signal received among all bidders except bidder 1. When s(k) = s we say that s is pivotal. Let s, be the random variable denoting the signal received by player 1. 
The proof is in Appendix 1. We provide intuition for the uniqueness result in Section 2.1. This is the equilibrium described by Milgrom (1981) . The new content of Proposition 1 is that this equilibrium is unique in the class of symmetric equilibria. It is easily checked that b(.) is strictly increasing. Note that in the case where the signal structure involves nontrivial X(s), this implies that the equilibrium is essentially mixed: players with equivalent signals make different bids. 
Now, for each s' E X(s), let b(s') E B be defined by H([min 9'(s), s' ] x [O, oo)) = H(F (s) X [O, b (s') ))
That is, b(s') is chosen so that the probability of a signal in [min F(s), s')] is the same as the probability of a signal in %'(s) and a bid of b(s') or less. Note that b(.) is increasing and thus uniquely defined almost everywhere. Consider modifying H by replacing behavior on X(s) by b(.). By construction, the probability that the player uses any given subset of B given a signal in 9'(s) is the same as before. Note that all signals in X(s) convey the same information about v, and about the signals and play of a bidder's opponents. Thus, the payoff to any given bid is the same for each element of &2(s) and hence the new strategy earns the player the same expected payoff, and generates the same observed distribution of behavior.
Uniqueness
Proposition 1 demonstrates uniqueness within the set of symmetric equilibria. In this section we provide intuition for that result. Readers whose sole interest is information aggregation can skip this section without loss of continuity.
There are two key steps in establishing uniqueness. The first is to establish that in equilibrium bids are increasing in signals.9 The second step is to establish that increasing equilibria cannot involve atoms, and so are in fact strictly increasing.10 It is then straightforward to establish that the equilibrium bid with signal s is equal to the expected value given that s is pivotal. This in turn 
INFORMATION AGGREGATION
Consider a sequence of auctions {Ar}-1 where the rth auction Ar has nr bidders and kr objects for sale. The structure on values, F, and signals G, is constant along the sequence, and satisfies all the assumptions already made. We will maintain the notation describing the equilibrium from the last section, with r subscripts where appropriate. For each r, Proposition 1 establishes that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. Let the random variable Pr describe the price in this equilibrium. We want to understand the conditions under which Pr approximates v as r gets large. dw Equation (4) says that independent of nr the highest bid in Ar is equal to the expected value of the object conditional on observing kr signals of 1. The idea is that s(kr) = 1 conveys the information that kr other players received signal 1. All other players received a signal less than 1 and since players receive a signal less than 1 with probability 1 for all v, this conveys no information about v. Thus, conditional on signal 1 being pivotal, the bidder's information is his own signal 1 plus the information that a set of kr other bidders also received 1. For any finite kr this implies that br(1) is strictly less than 1.13 Thus, any time v is more than br(l), price and value will diverge. We conclude that kr -so is a necessary condition for full information aggregation in this setting. Note that an implication of F(v Xr(S), S2 = s, sl = s) = F(v IXr(s)) is that in the limit, bidders are essentially information takers: their private information about quality is increasingly swamped by the information conveyed by being pivotal. Of course, given the rules of the auction, bidders are always price takers regardless of r.
We have proven that Pr converges to v in probability. In fact, this convergence is uniform over all v. Observe that while bids are increasing in s, the signal is in the limit a pure randomization device. A bidder's inference about the quality of the object is entirely derived from being pivotal. Similarly, if a bidder wins the object at a price p then independent of his private information he knows that the true value of the object is exactly p. Given the pure common value nature of the objects, this is what one should expect. We have already seen that when kr stays bounded, the top end of the support of bids remains less than 1, implying a failure of full information aggregation whenever v is sufficiently close to 1. We can now see that when kr stays bounded, full information aggregation fails for all v > E. In particular, since the expected number of active bidders is bounded, it can easily be shown that regardless of v, there is a probability bounded away from 0 that no one bids above E. Intuitively, very little is learned from inactive bidders, and so when the The following theorem shows that a sufficient condition for full information aggregation in this case is that in addition to double largeness, Vln-r yr -> To give an intuition for this condition note that if there are m bidders with an uninformative signal and if each of them bids above b with probability p, then the standard deviation of the number of these bidders who bid above any given b is =o(1 -p)pm -ob. To guarantee full information aggregation the actions of the informed bidders must in the limit determine whether the price is above or below b. A necessary condition for this is that ob must be small relative to the number of informed bidders. Since the number of bidders with the uninformative signal grows as nr, ab grows as nr. Hence our condition guarantees that (nrYy/lb) --co for all b. This implies that the informed bidders will typically dominate the noise introduced by bidders with no information.16 PROPOSITION 2: For the example given assume that n2 --> 0cc Let p. denote the random variable that describes the equilibrium price in the auction with nr bidders, kr objects, and value v. Then, Pr converges in probability to v if and only if double largeness holds. PROOF: Necessity is as before. In Appendix 2 we reprove Lemma 1 for the current information structure. The remainder of the proof of Theorem 2 is the same as the proof of Theorem 1.
A Small Fraction of Objects
Q.E.D.
The limiting properties of the equilibrium are worth notice. In the limit, all players who receive bad news bid 0, while all players who receive good news bid 1. Since, by full information aggregation, the equilibrium price is rarely near either 0 or 1, this implies that the pivotal bidder is almost never informed! To see how the equilibrium price can nevertheless aggregate information, note that almost all uninformed bidders bid either very close to 0 or very close to 1 and only a small (and vanishing) fraction of uninformed bidders randomizes between bids that are bounded away from zero and one."7 As a consequence, the equilibrium price is very sensitive to movement of informed bidders from bids of 0 to bids of 1 and hence the equilibrium price is sensitive to changes in v.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we give conditions under which a common value auction fully aggregates dispersed private information in the sense that the equilibrium price converges in probability to the true value of the object.
Note that in the formal model analyzed here information aggregation has no welfare consequences. As long as all objects are transferred from the seller to the buyers, a Pareto efficient allocation is achieved. Clearly, information aggregation is an interesting property independent of its connection to efficiency. In addition there are several simple extensions of the model in which full information aggregation is linked to allocative efficiency.
Suppose that in addition to the buyers' valuation v for the objects, nature also draws a valuation w < v -e of the objects for the seller. The seller observes w and v and can decide whether to put the objects up for sale or not. If he decides to put the objects up for sale, then an auction as described in this paper will be 
conducted. Full information aggregation implies that the seller will always put the objects up for sale (since w is always less than v -E).18 Thus the analysis of the auction is unchanged by the introduction of this additional stage and an efficient allocation is achieved for every v and w.
If, on the other hand, the seller sells only one object, and hence the equilibrium price is bounded away from 1, then for w close to 1 it cannot be an equilibrium for the seller to put the object up for sale. Thus an inefficient allocation will be realized with positive probability.
More generally, full information aggregation is linked to efficiency whenever we introduce an investment problem on the seller's side. To see this note that if full information aggregation does not hold, then the equilibrium price is either bounded away from 1 or from 0. In either case this implies that over some range an increase in the value v by A leads to an increase of the expected price of less than A. Thus, if the seller has control over some component of the object's value, then the seller does not have the right incentives for efficiency if full information aggregation does not hold.
On the buyers' side, learning the true value of the object may provide valuable information for related decisions. For example, information aggregated in the price of a financial asset may be relevant for deciding how to construct the rest of a portfolio.
In the formal setting, there is only one type of object. However, more generally, an auction is part of a larger economy. But then, price in this market is relevant for trade-offs made between other commodities, and price again plays an allocative role. 18It is clear that this is an equilibrium, since for r sufficiently large, the seller will receive v -e/2 > w with probability approaching 1. We also believe if r is sufficiently large, this is the only equilibrium (the issue is that if the seller does not always put the objects up for sale, then the buyers will update their beliefs about the value of the object when it is offered for sale).
Dept. of Economics
Suppose there is a positive probability under H of a bid strictly above 1. Then there is a positive probability that k + 1 bids, and thus the price is strictly larger than 1. But any bid that wins with positive probability at a price above 1 is strictly worse than a bid of 1 and we can conclude that bids are always less than 1. Our next lemma is the key to the proof that H must be increasing. It establishes that if there is a positive probability of bids above a certain level by types below some level, then there is no probability of bids below that level by any higher type. 
